As if two recent snowstorms weren’t enough for
Nanjing officials to contend with, there now seem to be two competing interpretations
of the lesson to be learned from that experience.
The first interpretation appeared shortly
after the city’s impressive cleanup was largely concluded and was rather
militaristic.[1]
The blizzards were battles, the local Party media said,
and they were won because
of the city and provincial-level governments, the military, and the masses. Particular
credit was given to official institutions and their preparation and energetic
response. The snowstorms were struggles--sieges, really--but Nanjing had
triumphed. Time to celebrate, and then move on.
That takeaway received more reinforcement in
the form of Thursday’s edition of Nanjing
Daily [南京日报], which included
a 20-page supplement, entitled “The Decisive Engagement Against Ice and Snow” [决战冰雪].[2]
The section, full of pictures of cadres and
citizens alike, led off with an essay that described Nanjing’s various city districts’
response to the storm’s “surprise attack before dawn” [凌晨袭] . Officials and others here, according to the account, believed
that “Nanjing is very sound! In the ultimate battle with ice and snow, Nanjing
can win!” [南京很拼!决战冰雪,南京能赢] . It was
that martial spirit and the mobilisation it engendered, this interpretation has it, which proved decisive.
There’s no disputing that there was city-wide
determination on display, and that a pair of storms that might have paralyzed
other places for days was dealt with expeditiously here in Nanjing.
But sliding in between these clarion calls of
battles waged and won was a somewhat different analysis of what it all meant.
Just the day before the lengthy supplement
above was distributed, an unsigned (and thus authoritative) commentary
appeared in Nanjing Daily.
The commentary, titled “The successful fight
against the blizzards highlights the city 's ‘inner strength’ [成功抗击暴雪彰显城市’内功’],” struggled to give credit for the city's triumph while being
cautionary.
The piece stated that while
it might be appropriate to conceive of Nanjing’s response to the snowstorms as
“a battle that has just been won,” the event actually offers the chance for “a
major review of the city's ability to govern”--“a
new opportunity for a new starting point…to promote the city governance system
and modernize its capacity.”
That’s because, the essay argues, “governance
capacity depends on not only the circumstances of normal governance, but also
the level of emergency management under abnormal conditions, especially the
ability of city managers to respond to emergencies.”
So it's right to draw lessons from the experience--but they need to be the correct ones, the commentary is saying.
One lesson,
the commentary contends, is that “it’s actually very
hard to use very powerful force” [用非常之力,竟非常之功]— a classical aphorism [成语] which usually denotes that authority is often limited in its
reach. In this instance, the essay implies that mass power—or mobilizing
the masses--doesn’t solve all problems, that there’s more to governance than gathering
up volunteers and going all-out. What made the campaign mentality possible was Nanjing's way of governing, according to the commentary.
Nanjing's approach revolves around the notion that “this is the age of examiners, where we [the government] administer
and evaluate tests, and so do the people.” [“时代是出卷人,我们是答卷人,人民是阅卷人”] .
In other words, each side has
expectations of the other, and decisions by authority are not made in a vacuum--they are and will be evaluated not only by cadres and bureaucrats, but residents.
This
commentary then seems to be arguing a different line—that the results on performance aren’t all
in yet. Beating the snowstorm might have been a battle, the essay concedes. But policymaking in
Chinese cities isn’t a war to be waged, so much as an ongoing process by which
government tries to prove itself as both concerned and competent all the time. “Inner
strength” makes it possible to be outstanding when crises such as these
snowstorms appear, but that needs to be nurtured.
It's as if some officials in Nanjing would prefer a little less backslapping and a little more back-and-forth. And it may well be that these are reformers within the Party speaking yet again about alternatives that are available, policy options that need further reinforcement, experiments that merit support.
It's as if some officials in Nanjing would prefer a little less backslapping and a little more back-and-forth. And it may well be that these are reformers within the Party speaking yet again about alternatives that are available, policy options that need further reinforcement, experiments that merit support.
There’s an even larger issue in play here.
A consistent political line is crucial in
China. It reflects the prevailing view of the Party and government leadership, and
indicates that decision-makers have achieved consensus. When such a line
exists, it provides a route for the State-controlled media to run stories on,
and enables readers (that is and often especially, other officials) to see what leaders
think and proceed accordingly. Debates and discussion, as well as
implementation, go more smoothly, because both upper and lower echelons of
authority are clear about what’s permitted and what’s not.
So for Nanjing to be showing two separate
lines about a major event—one of those saying that the Party-led government
triumphed, and the other saying that the situation really deserves further study—has
to concern some local officials, if only because of the lack of clarity in where
to go from here. Some provincial-level cadres might also be a bit worried.
Maybe this is a rift that provides an opportunity for open debate about just what city governments should be focusing on.
Maybe this is a rift that provides an opportunity for open debate about just what city governments should be focusing on.
But there’s already some
space between how Beijing wants to proceed with national policies and what
Nanjing believes will work locally. Nanjing will need to be careful to secure
consensus within its own walls soon, lest its ability to chart its own course melts away as
quickly as the snow here is is already starting to.
[1] Perry Link speaks of the use of military
metaphors in his An Anatomy of Chinese
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 251-254, but he doesn’t make
it entirely clear if he thinks that they’re being employed more now than in previous
decades.
[2] Normally, the various large kiosks that
display the daily editions of Nanjing
Daily put up every page for passersby to read and are changed regularly.
Thursday’s, containing the supplement, was evidently too long to be posted, and
so, in at least some kiosks, the previous day’s edition remained in place.
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