Is Politics Really In Command of the Chinese Military?

There’s a very long essay this morning on civil-military relations in Nanjing Daily, entitled “Politics Builds A Fighting Force: Consolidate The Original, Open The New, Forever Forward” [政治建军，固本开新永向前].

Pretty much every major Party and military media outlet is running the piece, which isn’t surprising given Beijing’s deepening control (read: centralisation) of news here.

What is striking is that someone here seems to feel the need for such a lengthy essay to appear.

The reason is found in what problems the essay propounds.

Like many similar expositions, this one proceeds—at least at first—chronologically, highlighting the evolution and certain achievements of the People’s Armed Forces. While the piece refers to the faith in the measures being undertaken to “build a world-class military” [建设世界一流军队], it’s clear that the Party leadership thinks that the Chinese military needs to respond to two political challenges.

The first challenge is from outside powers messing about with Chinese society.

“There’s an undercurrent surging of ‘color revolutions’ and “cultural transmutation [文化转基因],” the essay intones, echoing claims by Beijing hardliners that foreign forces are trying to subvert Party authority over society. 

According to the editorial, “anti-China forces are intensifying efforts to do everything possible to get Westernization to take root in China, trying to pull the People's Army away from the flag of the Party.” And because Chinese society itself is becoming more diversified, “hostile forces are accelerating ideological and cultural infiltration [文化渗透], the essay warns. Therefore, “officers and soldiers must always maintain political firmness and ideological and moral purity, and enhance their immunity [增强政治免疫力]” to such influences, including those who engage in “online distortions of our party and army history, and attempt to discredit our heroic martyrs and other heroes.”

To mention this issue signals that the military’s methods of combatting this threat have thus far fallen short.

The second problem for China’s armed forces, according to the essay, is that military corruption hasn’t gone away.

The essay reminds readers that “an army is always faced with two kinds of tests: One is the battlefield and the life-and-death duel with the enemy; the other is the risk of being destroyed by their own camp. [一支军队永远面对着两种考验：一个是战场上与敌人的生死对决，另一个是阵营内被自己打垮的危险.]

The second struggle isn’t done yet, though the piece is at pains to point out the progress made in identifying large-scale graft by the upper echelons, and gives the current Party leadership well-deserved credit for confronting the level and scale of corruption among some high-ranking officers. What’s still in process, according to the essay, is the construction of a comprehensive system of supervision—that is, institutional oversight by the political powers-that-be.

Whenever State media highlights circumstances and conditions, they’re almost always actually identifying illnesses. So while many in the international media are looking at China’s rising military capabilities, the Party leadership remains concerned about the institutional shortcomings of the armed forces here.

The way to address those deficiencies, according to the essay, is for the military to “intensify command consciousness” [强化号令意识]—that is, strengthen the armed forces’ allegiance to the Communist Party.[1]

That this matter needs more than just mentioning implies that questions of loyalty and support for the Party core evidently remain. If this essay is coming from Xi’s camp, then he and they are uneasy, and probably a bit unhappy. What direct action—if any—might be forthcoming isn’t made clear.

Still, this essay has a larger meaning. It could well be the start of a series of pronouncements—conclusions, really—about what was discussed at the Beidaihe meetings and what was agreed on there. Identifying what’s been resolved—and what hasn’t been—should indicate what sort of Party Congress the 19^th session is going to be. Already, it’s looking less simple and straightforward than some might have wished.

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[1] “The Party's absolute leadership of the armed forces is the essential distinguishing feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” [党对军队的绝对领导是中国特色社会主义的本质特征.] Later in the essay, there’s a particularly pointed reminder that the armed forces here belong to the Party, not the nation, and thus the need to continue to fight against “military nationalization” [军队国家化]. Apparently, that debate isn’t dead.

In Nanjing, Stability Suddenly Slides Back In

China’s Communist Party will hold its 19^th Party Congress later this year—an event where a major power struggle will occur and Chairman Xi Jinping will emerge with even greater authority (and possible longer tenure) than he enjoys presently.

Well, that’s at least according to the Establishment Narrative, which portrays Chinese politics as a cage-match, where all leaders are basically back-stabbers and spend all their time wrestling for even more influence than they already enjoy, neglecting policy in preparation for the main event.

But matters outside China’s Beltway show the situation to be otherwise.

What concerns local officials here in Jiangsu isn’t the event but the run-up. At least that’s what they’re talking about this month—ensuring a stable social environment while Party leaders try to decide the agenda at the 19^th Congress (and even when it will be held).

This emphasis on upholding social stability [维护社会安全稳定] that’s appeared in various forms in major Party media in recent days here is an interesting one. Nanjing government has only rarely used the term “stability” in recent years, and was even reluctant to mention it as a governing concept during demonstrations in 2011 and with other protests more recently. The local political apparatus is built for hearing complaints, soliciting input, and working political networks that rely on the longevity of families, friends, and residents who remain rather familiar with each other. The city is suffused with normal.

So this sudden focus on social stability is an awkward one for more than a few local officials here, simply because it's not been an ongoing concern.

The result is a whole raft of purportedly critical tasks out of Beijing that Nanjing authorities are now going to have to get going on.

For example, on August 19^th, high-level representatives from Jiangsu provincial government met to emphasize the need for Nanjing officials to “strongly pursue investigations of hidden dangers and to settle any social contradictions [they find]”[扎实推动隐患排查和矛盾化解]. Jiangsu Party Secretary Zhang Jinghua [张敬华], alluding to the Party Congress, stated that 2017 is “a year with special meaning and significance” [特殊重要意义的一年] and therefore so is the political responsibility of party cadres and government officials to focus on “safeguarding safety and stability [维护安全稳定作为].” Reform and development—that is change and growth as defined by Nanjing officials--remain crucial, Zhang acknowledged, but they can only be safeguarded [保障] if local political cadres work diligently to prevent major safety accidents, guard against mass incidents, and prevent petitioners from airing their grievances publicly [坚决守住不发生重大公共安全事件、不发生重特大安全生产事故、不发生重大群体性上访事件的底线]. This is Zhang trying to convince cadres that those tasks are now primary—“the first order of business” [“一把手工程”], as he insisted.

The objective of this effort, according to Zhang, is “to resolutely prevent chaos, [and to do so] by diagnosing what’s causing the turmoil” [坚决防止乱投医、乱拍板留下后遗症]. That means that Nanjing officials need to expand on what have become known here as “big visits” [大走访活动]—going to the grassroots, and look to investigate local disputes and prevent those from leading to large disruptions. 

But that's what local representatives have been doing for some weeks now, so to do more of that--that's easy, but has to strike some as perhaps unnecessary.

Indeed, if all that were straightforward and easily absorbed and implemented by the local authorities, there'd have been no need for Nanjing mayor Miao Ruilin [缪瑞林] to continue the same theme of preserving social stability less than a week later in an address to local officials. But it wasn’t any of those things; which is why Miao had to step forward and push the issue.

“Without security, there’s simply nothing” [没有安全就没有一切], Miao insisted, and told attendees that apart from preventing unrest, they needed to guarantee the “Three No Occurrences” [“三个不发生”]. That’s a set of events that must not happen, as defined by the region and organization (e.g., a local government authority making sure traffic disruptions do not occur). Miao didn't provide what that list is for Nanjing specifically, and so it’s likely still under discussion[1]. It's Beijing's template, not Nanjing's, and so it's not easy to simply get going with.

Miao’s comments as carried in news accounts also made it clear that the city was still having trouble coordinating various departments and getting officials to focus on stability as “the overriding political task” [压倒一切的政治任务]. Mentioning the importance of synchronizing responsibilities is always a sign that’s not been happening and that someone needs to be reminded.

Given Nanjing’s unfamiliarity with having to repress social disagreement, it’s not shocking that departments and agencies don't know whom to talk with.

Still, what's the problem?

Well, what concerns central-level officials aren’t common protesters,[2] but comrade politicians—people like Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, who saw themselves losing political battles in Beijing and would have turned to the street to try to mobilize support if they hadn’t been seized and their networks rolled up. Apparently, some high-level officials who see themselves on the losing end of policy debates in the run-up to the Party Congress could seek to trigger or at least take advantage of local disturbances. The directive being pushed at Nanjing is to get officials here to prevent social unrest because Beijing believes that losers might seek to spark troubles if they’re about to be sidelined. Nanjing's being shoved to implement isn’t aimed at unrest for local reasons; it's being pressed to prepare for instability that might be engineered from above.

Yes, the Party Congress will be crucial, but for rather different reasons than are being asserted all too often. Just as important, it's far from a done deal. That at least one local government is preparing for the possibility of political unpleasantness should give even further pause for wondering how the next few months are going to go.

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[1] One further sign of the contention is that there’s a rather different portrayal of Zhang’s speech provided here, one that emphasizes social governance as a means to stability—which sounds an awful lot like continuing what’s been working for Nanjing: http://news.163.com/17/0817/06/CS18L2KK000187VI.html

[2] The Establishment Narrative portrays Beijing as being terrified of instability, scared about dissidents, lawyers, activists who look to transform anger into organized opposition aimed at overthrowing the Party. But the local reality for many officials is very different. In China, protests are dealt with locally, and authorities have proven to be far more creative and resilient in coping with unrest than those looking to foment it. When there has been resistance, it’s been limited, local and almost always unaffiliated with activists or social organizers. The lone rebel is aesthetically attractive to many who report on China; but such activists make a minor footprint or two while the Party pursues its own path and isn’t afraid or incapable of running down those blocking the road. Unfortunately, too many stories turn what are essentially tales of just power into stories of justice denied. That's emotionally satisfying for some, but ultimately unrevealing and quite misleading.

Who Gets to Drive And Park Public Policy in China?

How and where in Nanjing you should park your car is a trifling but telling story of public policy in contemporary China.

In 2011, Nanjing had 990,710 registered cars. By the end of 2016, the city had 2.2 million passenger vehicles.

Traffic flow is one problem, but parking is a larger one. For many residents, it’s not how fast you go but where you end up in Nanjing that’s the daily test. The city is adding new parking spaces and requisitioning old ones, but beyond a general sense that more slots and structures are needed—and neighborhood initiatives for specific streets undertaken—sentiment is split among local officials about how best to meet this challenge.

There are The Enablers: the same sort of Modernising Reformers pushing the age-old Chinese effort at change through scientific innovation. These days, it’s the notion that more sophisticated technology can be used to inform and guide public policy. Science may or may not save China, but this camp sees it as an essential problem-solver.

For example, many local governments in China are utilizing new technologies for data collection. For many observers, that means using “Big Data” for assembling social credit scores to more closely monitor citizens and their conduct. But as local officials see matters, they need data simply to know more about the society they’re supposed to be governing and to create options for managing it. Nanjing had been employing information to gain a clearer sense of traffic problems--for example identifying the likely travel routes taken by drunk drivers), and tracking pedestrian traffic at local shopping malls, among other initiatives.

In the case of parking challenges in Nanjing, according to this school of thinking, Big Data can identify traffic patterns and the supply-and-demand situation about parking, eventually pass that information in real-time to drivers looking for parking spaces, and, in the interim, look at ways to construct better venues for parking.

As with other Chinese cities, more than a few of these measures go well beyond experiments: Publicly available documents[1] make it clear that Enablers have been successful at kick-starting programs of data collection that are producing new policies. While for many observers these efforts are invasive and Orwellian, for local officials here, this strategy is simply seen as better social management—a policy path of technocracy combining with autocracy.

Then there are The Disciplinarians: Hardline conservatives who want to manage Chinese society spiritually, whereby the Communist party is the most physical and metaphysical force of and for all.

This group of officials doesn’t rely on innovation; just on the idea that what’s ails Chinese society isn’t a lack of institutional modernization but a dearth of individual moderation.

In their view, the solution is civilizing citizens. And to do that, it’s necessary to shame the misbehaving ones.

To that end where parking is concerned, Nanjing Daily [南京日报] frequently publishes photos taken of violators—vehicles parked illegally or blocking traffic. It’s a throwback to the campaigns of old, which sought to identify transgressors of various shapes and sizes, depending on the political season.

The Disciplinarians aren’t naïve or Neanderthals: They know that technology has its place in Postmodern China. They just believe that The State, not Science, should dominate. It's public policy by enforcement, powered by ideology.

So this is a contest--between reformers who believe that nation-building here is best done by taking advantage of progress already made and making the system smarter, versus conservatives who think that further advancement will only come with tighter controls and instilling a deeper sense of awe for the power of the State. The lean towards Big Data is a move both support, but for very different reasons. The former sees it as making public policy sharper; the latter likes it as a blunt instrument to bludgeon those who disobey.

What’s true for Nanjing is true for China generally, and who wins the battle here for what sort of public policy gets adopted will both affect and reflect politics at higher levels. In China, it’s not only where you end up; it’s who gets to drive there.

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[1] An excellent compilation and analysis of many of the social credit initiatives here can be found at http://china-social-credit.com. There’s no better research available in China or abroad on this subject thus far than that done by Dr. Floria Sapio.