There’s an
interesting essay at the China File website entitled, “Why’s Beijing So
Worried About Western Values Infecting China’s Youth?” by Eric Fish. Fish’s
own book on China’s millennials is seen by many in the China-Watching Establishment
as a shrewd analysis of China’s young and potentially activist generation, possibly
in part because it supports the notion that the next cohort may well bring
about the sort of change in China that many of these observers want to believe
in.
Fish’s take in the present essay seems to strike the same
positive chord for some: That China’s current leadership is anxious enough
about the prospect of youth rising up in political resentment here that authorities
have assembled a set of draconian measures to control the classroom,
specifically Western influence at universities and elsewhere. Surveys taken of
students here, according to Fish, indicate that many Chinese youth are
favorably disposed towards democracy as well as for what passes for American
culture, so Chinese leaders are right to be uneasy.
But there are ample reasons to wonder about this
interpretation of China’s youth, as well as the assumption that Beijing is
“worried”.
The article cites three surveys of Chinese students--in
2007, 2009 and 2011. It’s not at all clear how relevant these surveys are to
China’s current youth, especially since they are somewhat dated and they’re
about students, not other sectors of youth. Another analysis that
Fish refers to was recently published (in 2016,) but it’s not clear when
the survey was conducted (the original article doesn’t say) and, in any event, the
total number of interviewees was 29--all of whom said that they were already viewers
of various American television series. How fans of, say, Friends are more likely to evolve into an anti-government political
force isn’t explained, but it appears to have been assumed that if you harbor
such tastes you’re likely to dislike China’s current leaders.
In fact, when Fish’s article refers to “China’s youth”,
what’s really being talked about are some
students at some Chinese
universities—almost always in Beijing, which means the better endowed and
established schools, where it’s often the children of elites and the well-placed
who go to get credentialed instead of intellectually enlightened.
Fish also cites an article
by University of Southern California Professor Stanley Rosen, noting that,
according to Fish, shows deep concern on the part of Chinese officials with the
attraction of Western culture for China’s young, drew on “surveys conducted for
internal government use never released to the public due to political
sensitivity, which [Rosen] accessed through contacts in government-affiliated
think tanks.”
But while Rosen’s article is more nuanced (noting for
example that there are many foreign influences on China’s youth, not just
American ones—such as Korean pop idols), there’s reason to wonder about the inference
that it’s especially authoritative because it relies on an internal study (or
perhaps more than one) of youth attitudes by Chinese government departments and
institutes. If there were staff at one of these think-tanks who allowed a
foreign scholar to see the study (or at least shared its findings), they were
taking an enormous risk doing so—and it’s not immediately apparent why they’d
do that. It’s rare to find such risk-taking in think-tanks here in China,
especially given the supervision the analysts there live under simply because they are one of the main contacts for foreign
scholars and are government organizations, not private ones. Maybe they were
particularly courageous--or perhaps the level of
classification wasn’t all that high, making the findings perhaps less
compelling than what’s implied in Fish’s article. It's tough to tell, and so caution is probably called for here, too.
In short, there are reasonable questions that should be raised
about validity and reliability in this regard, especially when efforts are made
to extrapolate this limited data to a more general universe—say, employed
youth, young laborers still looking for work, and so on, without distinction of
gender or location either. If one is speaking of Chinese students in select
universities in Beijing and some of their attitudes about American culture,
maybe that says something about them specifically. But the claims made in the Fish article are more far-reaching than that, the inferences even
more so.
Finally, there’s the Chinese government view as presented in
Fish’s essay. As with many commentaries about China under Xi Jinping, the essay
speaks of “China’s leaders”—a category that evidently encompasses the entire Chinese
Communist party as well as the government apparatus, without any reference to
differences of opinion or debate between political elites. As a whole, we’re
informed, China’s leaders are frightened, anxious, concerned, worried—the terms
may differ but the sentiment seems the same: They’re scared of society. And
it’s “them” here: The possibility that some Chinese political elites might well
be not all that anxious about youth attitudes (whatever those are) or have
other points of view apparently isn’t possible, or at least it’s not even
raised.
For evidence of this anxiety, Fish’s article points to Xi
Jinping’s recent speech on ideology and political instruction in China’s
universities, and an
editorial by the current Minister of Education Chen Baosheng [陈宝生], that immediately followed Xi’s address.
Both are important indicators of sentiment in Beijing, but
neither pronouncement necessarily indicates a heightened fear in the corridors
of power here.
In fact, Xi’s speech, while talking extensively about universities,
is
actually a part of a larger campaign focused on cadres and how they’re
managing not to do a very good job managing the Party’s impact generally and
the need to step up. (Fish’s article helpfully provides a link
to the official summary of the speech in English, but the actual speech as
reprinted in People’s Daily is far more
revealing and should have been relied on.) Xi makes no direct mention in his speech of threats from the West,
only the need to build up socialism. That's a critical point, and unsurprising really: The threat Xi
sees isn’t from Westernization per se but a failure within the Party to protect
socialism from neglect so that Western influences can be deflected or absorbed
appropriately. That’s where Xi’s focus is—protecting the Party against itself,
not fighting off social threats from students who are watching foreign
television or hearing about the odd international perspective from their professors. (Left unmentioned in Fish's essay is the desultory attitude that many instructors here take towards their classes and students.)
The editorial from Minister Chen that Fish cites has a somewhat different
take—indicating again that there are important distinctions to be made where the
actual views of China’s decision-makers are concerned. The headline of the
Sina.com news site does emphasize the efforts by hostile forces to penetrate
Chinese campuses, but the editorial is actually devoted to
explaining in Marxist language how knowledge is acquired and should be
conveyed. So it's not an attack on foreign influence as its central theme. This isn't a leading Chinese elite lashing out at the West and worried
to death, but a high-level bureaucrat instructing his charges not to neglect
Party values. Chen may see insidiousness on the part of some outsiders, but in
this essay at least, he’s really speaking to the inattention of education
administrators and internal shortcomings, not some all-out assault by
Westerners, which is what's implied in Fish's articles.
Most importantly, it’s not at all clear how anyone can truly
discern anxiety or fright among China’s leaders. Indeed, it’s apparent in
actual conversations with many officials (not only local cadres) that their concerns
are often other than what some observers abroad insist that they must be, and
that they’re pretty confident in their own capabilities. Maybe China’s elites
are wrong to be anything but scared stiff, but how anyone can tell without
actually asking them (or at least reading what they actually said and wrote with
particular care) remains as much a mystery as how some students based primarily
in Beijing suddenly represent China’s political future.
Have you seen this related article? It links to more recent research.
ReplyDeletehttp://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/07/surprise-findings-chinas-youth-are-getting-less-nationalistic-not-more/
Thanks for the citation. I did see the article, found it interesting, but had a bit of an issue with some of the indicators (the validity of using content analysis in newspapers when we're altering about grassroots emotions is one of those).
DeleteIt's also interesting that some Chinese scholars and analysts here I know find interpretations of nationalism as quite overdone by outsiders. They may well be wrong, but the general view here (and that's all it is) is that angry youth are just angry and they are young: they can be brought around by more attention from Beijing and are hardly the threat or political force some make them out to be. One wonders. What is clear to me at least on the ground (which is to say, I think I am seeing this, though I could also be misreading) is that many local residents don't care at all about issues of say Lotte and THAAD, and see efforts by some (including the odd official or commentator) to mobilise the masses as nonsensical.
Great post. Articulate, thoughtful and succinct.
ReplyDeleteIncidentally, switching to a new Wordpress theme (a one-click process) will allow your work to be read on mobile devices. And setting up an RSS feed will allow aggregators to make it more widely available. I use Level 1 contractors on Fiverr.com for this kind of work. Cheap and fast...
Thanks very much for both the kind words and the suggestion. I'm looking into presentation options as I go along, though a bit worried by one news item which reported some problems with Wordpress. And you are right as before about the need for an RSS feed.
ReplyDelete